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Despite popular accounts that link public housing demolitions to spatial redis-
tribution of crime, and possible increases in crime, little systematic research 
has analyzed the neighborhood or city-wide impact of demolitions on crime. In 
Chicago, which has conducted the largest public housing demolition program 
in the United States, I ﬁ  nd that public housing demolitions are associated with a 
10 percent to 20 percent reduction in murder, assault, and robbery in neighbor-
hoods where the demolitions occurred. Furthermore, violent crime rates fell by 
about the same amount in neighborhoods that received the most displaced public 
housing households relative to neighborhoods that received fewer displaced 
public housing households, during the period when these developments were be-
ing demolished. This suggests violent crime was not simply displaced from the 
neighborhoods where demolitions occurred to neighborhoods that received the 
former public housing residents. However, it is impossible to know what would 
have happened to violent crime in the receiving neighborhoods had the demoli-
tions not occurred. Finally, using a panel of cities that demolished public hous-
ing, I ﬁ  nd that the mean public housing demolition is associated with a drop of 
about 3 percent in a city’s murder rate and about 2 percent in a city’s assault rate. 
I interpret these ﬁ  ndings as evidence that while public housing demolitions may 
push crime into other parts of a city, crime reductions in neighborhoods where 
public housing is demolished are larger than crime increases in other neighbor-
hoods. A caveat is that while the city-wide reduction in assault rate appears to be 
permanent, the city-wide reduction in murder rate seems to last for only a few 
years.
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Large public housing developments, particularly those with high-rise buildings, have had a
reputation as epicenters of crime and gang activity. Beginning in October 1992, the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began to award grants to
local public housing authorities that could be used for demolition and revitalization of public
housing through a program that has come to be known as HOPE VI.1 By 2003, HUD had
awarded over $390M in demolition grants to local public housing authorities. In addition,
HUD awarded more than $5.8B in revitalization grants from 1993 through 2006. Under
HOPE VI, more than 50,000 units of distressed public housing will be demolished and about
the same number of units will be developed. One of the objectives of the HOPE VI program
is to \provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very-low-income
families."2 To that end, public housing in the United States is moving away from the old
model of large developments including high-rise buildings and moving toward more low-rise,
scattered-site, and mixed-income developments.3 How has the HOPE VI program aected
crime near the demolition sites and in the rest of the city?
This paper evaluates the impact of HOPE VI on crime.4 Economic theory does not
provide a clear prediction about the expected impact of this program on crime. On one
hand, if there are peer eects in crime, then one might expect demolishing high-rise public
housing to reduce city-wide crime by decreasing the density of poverty in neighborhoods
where poverty is most concentrated.5 By similar reasoning, public housing demolition could
lead to a reduction in city-wide crime if dispersing subsidized housing more evenly throughout
the city results in fewer areas where informal social controls have broken down.6 One might
1HOPE VI program information is available at: http://www.hud.gov/oces/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/
2Popkin et al. (2002)
3Goetz (2003) points out that HOPE VI can be viewed as the second generation of subsidized housing dispersal programs.
The rst being the fair housing movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Erickson (2009) refers to HOPE VI as \one of
the most important new HUD programs in the 1990s" and notes the involvement of numerous organizations such as community
development corporations and state and local governments in the design and rebuilding of new development in sites where
public housing was demolished.
4Another recent study of the local impact of a large federal program is Busso and Kline (2007). The authors nd that the
federal Empowerment Zone program had signicant positive eects on local labor and housing markets.
5Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2008) show evidence of the existence of criminal peer eects in juvenile correctional facilities
in Florida. Case and Katz (1991) nd evidence that residence in a neighborhood where peers are involved in crime increases
the probability that an individual is involved in crime. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) analyze a social interaction
model with multiple equilibria to explain spatial variation in crime rates. Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie (1996) propose a
dierent model, also featuring multiple equilibria, in which spatial variation in crime rates is driven by the assumption that
a criminal's chance of being caught is a decreasing function of the number of other criminals operating in the same area.
Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) document evidence of thresholds in the minority share of a neighborhood beyond which the
neighborhood may move toward an equilibrium with either 0% or 100% minority share. These non-linearities are consistent
with the existence of multiple equilibria predicted by social interaction models.
6Geographic concentration of poor households may lead to breakdowns in informal social controls, exacerbating crime
1also expect public housing demolition to decrease city-wide crime if the physical structure
of high-rise public housing buildings provides a unique environment which is hard to police,
and thus particularly suited to gang activity.7 On the other hand, the level of city-wide
crime could remain the same if crime is simply displaced from neighborhoods that are being
revitalized to other poor neighborhoods.8 Finally, net crime might even be expected to
increase if displaced residents have a hard time adapting to their new neighborhoods, rival
gangs are pushed into each other's territory, or police nd it hard to adapt to new spatial
patterns of criminal activity.9
I split my analysis into two parts. In the rst part, I examine the local eect of pub-
lic housing demolition on neighborhoods where high-rise public housing was demolished in
Chicago. I nd that public housing demolitions are associated with large reductions in neigh-
borhood violent crime. In the second part, I assess the degree to which crime was displaced
by public housing demolitions. I begin by estimating the change in crime associated with
an inux of displaced public housing residents to a neighborhood. While violent crime tends
to fall in neighborhoods that received a large share of displaced public housing residents,
it is impossible to know how it would have changed had they not moved in. For a more
denitive answer, I estimate the eect of public housing demolitions on crime rates for a
panel of 121 cities that received HOPE VI demolition grants. I nd that demolitions are
associated with about a 3% reduction in city-wide murder rates and about a 2% reduction
in city-wide assault rates, implying that any increase in these crimes due to displacement is
smaller in total than decreases in neighborhoods that are directly aected by public housing
demolitions. One caveat is that the reduction in the murder rate lasts only a few years, while
the reduction in the assault rate appears to be permanent.
The degree to which the demolition of high-rise public housing can reduce crime, and
thereby increase neighborhood and city-wide amenity values is interesting from both an
problems. See Skogan (1990). Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) and Moreno, Sampson, and Raudenbush (2001) nd that the
degree of \collective ecacy", social control of public space, is associated with the level of violent crime. Hirscheld and Bowers
(1997) study the connection between crime and \social cohesion". See Sampson, Moreno, and Gannon-Rowley (2002) for an
overview of \neighborhood eects" in the sociology literature. Joseph, Chaskin, and Webber (2007) discuss the theoretical
justications for mixed-income development as a means to address poverty.
7This explanation is related to the theory of defensible space as popularized by Newman (1972).
8Evidence of crime displacement due to weather shocks has been shown by Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007).
9Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) nd that male youths randomly selected to relocate to lower-poverty areas have lower
probabilities of arrest for violent crime, but higher probabilities of arrest for property crime. Hagedorn and Rauch (2007)
suggest that the fall in Chicago's homicide rate may have been delayed by conicts created when gang members displaced by
public housing closures relocated to rival gang territory. Rosin (2008) argues that police were not prepared for the new spatial
distribution of crime caused by public housing demolition and resident relocation.
2urban economics perspective and a public policy perspective. From the viewpoint of ur-
ban economics, the fact that total crime might decrease by dismantling concentrated public
housing developments and relocating residents to low-rise and scattered-site developments is
consistent with economic theories of criminal peer eects, urban planning theories of defensi-
ble space, and sociological theories of crime and disorder. From a public policy perspective,
the extent to which concentrated public housing imposes a larger externality, through its
impact on crime and property values, than would be imposed by scattered-site public hous-
ing is important for policy makers and urban planners when weighing the costs and benets
of where and how to oer subsidized housing.10
Estimating the impact of public housing demolition on crime is complicated by a number
of issues. Estimates that simply compare the level of crime before demolition to the level of
crime after demolition will reveal the change in crime that is correlated with public housing
demolition, but, in general, will not reveal the change in crime that is caused by public
housing demolition in the presence of other time-varying factors that inuence crime, such
as changes in the number of police or rising prison populations.11 Naive comparisons of the
change in crime levels in neighborhoods where public housing is demolished to the change
in crime levels in neighborhoods where public housing is not demolished may be confounded
by dierences in pre-existing trends. To overcome these empirical problems, I compare
neighborhoods where public housing has been demolished to other neighborhoods where
public housing will be demolished or is in the process of being demolished. To estimate the
eect of public housing demolition on neighborhood-level crime in Chicago neighborhoods,
I exploit variation in both the timing and number of high-rise public housing buildings or
units closed per year. To estimate the city-wide eect of public housing demolition on crime,
I employ an empirical strategy in which identication comes from variation in the timing
and size of demolition grants awarded by HUD across cities. In both cases, the sample
contains only the aected geographic units: the eight Chicago neighborhoods that contained
high-rise family public housing in 1990 or the set of cities that received demolition grants. In
10While other studies have investigated the impact of public housing on public housing residents, none have looked at its
impact on crime in surrounding neighborhoods and the city as a whole. Using data from Chicago, Jacob (2004) compares
the educational outcomes of children who moved out of public housing because their buildings were closed for demolitions to
outcomes of those who remained. He nds no signicant dierence in outcomes between the two groups. Currie and Yelowitz
(2000) and Oreopoulos (2003) also study educational and future labor market outcomes of children in public housing and do
not nd negative impacts of public housing when compared to other low-income households.
11Levitt (2004) names these among possible factors that contributed to falling crime rates in the 1990's.
3practice, specications for both sets of estimates include xed-eects and year-eects. For the
neighborhood level analysis, xed-eects control for persistent dierences in crime, housing,
or construction levels between neighborhoods. Year-eects control for any transitory shocks
that aect outcomes in all eight neighborhoods where public housing is demolished. Thus,
identication relies on the assumption that there are no other factors that aect crime or
housing outcomes that are correlated with public housing closures, and cannot be controlled
for by neighborhood- and year-eects. A parallel identication assumption is required for
the city-level analysis.
In Chicago, I nd that demolition of high-rise public housing led to large decreases
in violent crime in the neighborhoods where demolitions occurred. I estimate a decrease
of about 0.5 murders per 100,000 people per year per 100 high-rise public housing units
closed. For the eight neighborhoods that contained high-rise public housing, this represents
a decrease of about 11 murders per 100,000 people per year from a pre-demolition average
of 99 murders per 100,000 people per year, roughly an 11% drop. The estimates for assault
translate to about 470 fewer assaults per 100,000 people per year, or a 14% decrease from
the pre-demolition average of 3,300 assaults per 100,000 people per year. Estimates for
robbery indicate a fall of about 830 per 100,000 people per year, or 21% due to demolitions.
Burglaries fall by about 280 per 100,000 people (11%). Finally, using a panel of cities that
received HOPE VI demolition grants, I nd evidence that public housing demolitions reduced
city-wide murder, assault, and auto-theft rates by about 1% to 3%. These results suggest
that, within cities, the direct benet of public housing demolition in reducing crime within
a neighborhood is larger than any possible displacement eects which might increase crime
in other parts of the city.12
These results have several implications for policy makers. First, my ndings are consistent
with the existence of criminal peer eects and other theories from the social sciences which
predict that total crime production increases as the spatial concentration of poverty increases.
An optimal strategy for local public housing authorities and policy makers whose objective
is to minimize crime may be to distribute low-income housing more evenly throughout the
12An overview and assessment of the literature concerning the unexpected decrease in crime during the 1990's is provided
by Levitt (2004). While public housing demolitions are not mentioned as a possible explanation, one of the factors that is
mentioned is the receding crack epidemic. In as far as demolition of high-rise public housing denied gangs a place to sell crack
in which there was less risk of being caught by police than on the street or in smaller public housing developments, the receding
crack epidemic may be related to changes brought about by the HOPE VI program.
4city. However, there is no guarantee that this policy would maximize welfare. Consider a
scenario in which households have heterogeneous preferences with respect to crime and have
sorted into neighborhoods based upon these preferences. The value of decreasing crime to
a household that decided to live near a high-rise public housing development may be less
than the cost of increasing crime for a household that chose to live far from public housing
developments. However, the fact that city-wide crime decreases substantially indicates that
the cost of increasing crime in neighborhoods far from public housing would have to be very
large for the demolition of public housing to have a negative impact on social welfare through
its eect on crime.13
2 Background on Public Housing and HOPE VI
2.1 A Brief History of Public Housing
In the United States, federally provided public housing dates back to 1918, when 16,000 units
were built for workers during World War I. The passage of the 1937 National Housing Act
established the current system of local, independent housing authorities that receive federal
money and perform the tasks of building and managing public housing. Under this program,
and continuing through World War II, the Federal government nanced the construction of
365,000 permanent housing units and an even greater number of temporary units. As World
War II veterans returned, and African-American migration from the rural south to northern
cities continued, urban housing was in short supply. In 1949, a new Housing Act was
passed, providing loans and subsidies for the construction of about 810,000 units of low-rent
housing.14 While the pace of building and the uptake rate of federal funds varied from city to
city, a large number of federally subsidized, low-rent housing units were built over the next
fteen years. However, from the mid-1970's through the early 1990's, conditions in public
housing deteriorated signicantly. Problems associated with public housing included high
crime and low educational and employment outcomes of residents. Furthermore, much of the
stock of public housing was in disrepair. Funding had been cut during the 1980's, resulting
13Of course, households may re-sort after crime drops near the demolition sites. The drop in crime may increase the amenity
value of land near the demolition sites by increasing demand for housing from people that place a high value on low crime. Other
studies have found that crime or perceived possibility of crime may have an impact on property values. Linden and Rocko
(2008) nd that the arrival of a sex oender leads to a drop in nearby home prices of about $5,500. Similarly, Pope (2006)
estimates that sex oenders lead to about a $3,500 drop in home prices. Gibbons (2004) nds an increase in property value
of a slightly smaller magnitude is associated with a tenth of a standard deviation reduction in incidents of criminal damage in
inner London.
14Meyerson and Baneld (1955).
5in deferred maintenance, and contributing to the large and growing costs of rehabilitation.15
In Chicago, site selection for new public housing units to be constructed during the 1950's
was a contentious issue.16 The CHA initially proposed some sites on vacant land in outlying
neighborhoods that were predominantly White and other sites in poor African-American
neighborhoods closer to the center of the city, which were not vacant but were deemed to
be \blighted slums". This classication was meant to indicate areas where housing was not
structurally sound, and living conditions were deemed to be unsanitary. Many of the city
council members whose wards contained the sites that were proposed in the outlying areas
organized an opposition which threatened to derail the entire plan of building up to 40,000
new units of housing over a six-year period. In the end, the CHA was denied the use of
most of the vacant land sites. Construction of public housing that took place from 1950 to
1964 was either as an extension of an existing development, or on a site that was in a poor
African-American neighborhood. The public housing buildings built in Chicago during this
time were almost all high-rises.17
2.2 The HOPE VI Program
From the mid-1970's through 1992, laws requiring one-for-one replacement of demolished
units in order to qualify for HUD funding made demolition of public housing a prohibitively
expensive option for local public housing authorities. However, after severe funding cuts
during the 1980's, much of the public housing stock was in need of repair. In October 1992,
a new housing bill and HUD appropriations bill changed the law to make funding available
for demolition and redevelopment of distressed public housing developments. The program
created by the law eventually became known as HOPE VI (the sixth iteration of a program
identied by an acronym which stood for \Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere").18
During the period from 1993 through 2006, the HOPE VI program awarded the CHA
$258M in revitalization grants representing 4.4% of the total $5.8B awarded to local housing
agencies. Of the 127 housing authorities that were awarded HOPE VI demolition grants
from 1996 through 2003, the CHA received $83.4M of grant money for the demolition of
12,500 units of public housing, representing about 21% of the total HOPE VI demolition
15Poliko (2006).




6grants awarded in terms of dollars or numbers of units.
The only other cities that were awarded more than $10M in demolition grants were
New Orleans with $25.2M, Philadelphia with $23.0M, Pittsburgh with $16.5M, Detroit with
$15.1M, Atlanta with $14.2M, and Bualo and Memphis both with $10.4M. The two largest
cities, New York and Los Angeles, were awarded only $0.7M and $6.0M, respectively.
The scope of the HOPE VI program was broadened when, in 1996, the United States
Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act. Section
202 of this law required local housing authorities to remove any units from their stock that
cost more to maintain than the combined cost of demolition and provision of voucher-based
private sector rental assistance (known as Section 8 Vouchers or Housing Choice Vouchers).
As a result, in 1998, the CHA announced that all Chicago's gallery-style high-rise public
housing developments had failed the viability test and were slated for demolition. In February
2000, the Chicago Housing Authority's Plan for Transformation was approved by HUD. The
plan called for the demolition of roughly 22,000 units of public housing out of an existing stock
of about 40,000 units. The remaining units were to be rehabilitated and an additional 8,000
units were to be constructed, leaving the city with approximately 25,000 new or revitalized
units by the end of the ten-year plan, equivalent to the number of units that were occupied
at the time the plan was drawn up. The proposed redevelopments focused on mixed-income
housing employing private developers and management companies.19
3 Local Eect of Public Housing Demolition
In this section, I estimate the local eect of public housing demolition on crime for neigh-
borhoods in Chicago where high-rise public housing was demolished.
3.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
For this analysis, I use data on public housing and crime for the City of Chicago.
3.1.1 CHA Building Occupancy, Closure, and Demolition Data
I use data on the stock of public housing units from the early 1990's (42,681 units) and
monthly occupancy rates and building closures for a subset of buildings comprising 23,347
19More information on the CHA's Plan for Transformation can be found at http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/files/
plan_for_transformation_brochure.pdf. Rosenbaum, Stroh, and Flynn (1998) study Lake Parc Place, one of the rst low-
income public housing developments in Chicago that was converted to mixed-income housing.
7units. These building-level detail data sets are from the Chicago Housing Authority and were
provided to me by Brian Jacob.20 These data cover the years from 1990 through 2000. Figure
1 shows which community areas contained high-rise family public housing developments.21
I also use building level data on the number of housing units demolished from 2000 through
2007 from the Chicago Housing Authority's annual plans and reports. Table 1 lists all
family CHA developments, indicates whether the development contains high-rise buildings,
the year of construction, and the number of units the development has, broken down by the
community area in which the units are located.
Building occupancy and closure data come from two sources. Occupancy and closure data
for the years 1990 through 2000 were provided to me by Brian Jacob. Jacob's data come
from a comprehensive building list provided by the Chicago Housing Authority detailing the
stock of public housing in Chicago in the early 1990's at the address level and the number
of units at each address. A separate le contains monthly observations (from 1990 - 2000)
of the number of units that were occupied for a subset of the buildings on the list. The
building list provides the addresses of 42,681 units of public housing. Of these, 32,707 are
family housing and 9,974 are senior housing. I focus on the family housing buildings. The
occupancy le covers 27,874 of the 32,707 family units. Of the 4,833 family units which
are not covered in the occupancy data, 2,939 units are in scattered-site buildings, and 955
units are in City-State housing developments (leaving only 939 family units which are not
scattered-site or City-State that are missing from the occupancy data). Furthermore, all
19,237 family units that are not City-State, and are not scattered-site and are in buildings
with more than 35 units, are included in the occupancy data set.
I compile occupancy and building closure data from CHA annual reports from 2001
through 2007. Building closure lists in the annual reports give the address of the building,
allowing me to link these later closures to the CHA building list. However, the occupancy
data are by development. To determine occupancy by community area, I assign each devel-
opment to one or multiple community areas based upon the fraction of units located in each
community area for the old developments as documented in the building list.
The data contain a total of 107 high-rise building closures from the period 1990 - 2007.
20Brian Jacob is the Walter H. Annenberg Professor of Education Policy in the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at
the University of Michigan.
21I use the terms neighborhood and community area interchangeably throughout this paper. For more information on Chicago
community areas see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_areas_of_Chicago.
8The number of units in the buildings aected by closures ranges from 48 to 230 with a
mean of 130. The buildings are spread across eight community areas. Of the buildings
that were closed, 86 were in the Near West Side, Grand Boulevard, Douglas, and the Near
North Side community areas. Figure 2 shows the annual number of high-rise building units
closed. I compile building demolitions by address from CHA annual plans and reports for
the years 2000 through 2007. I rely on newspaper articles and online publications to identify
demolitions that occurred before 2000. Table 2 provides summary statistics from the 1990
census and 2000 census regarding the eight community areas where high-rise public housing
was demolished and the City of Chicago as a whole.
3.1.2 Chicago Neighborhood Crime Data
I use crime data drawn from Chicago Police Department annual reports, which provide
detailed counts of major crime types for each of the city's 77 community areas. These data
cover the period from 1991 through 2007. I also use data on murders in Chicago from 1965
to 1995 that provide census tract level geographic details from Block, Block, and the Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority (1998). Both data sets use crime denitions that
conform to those of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. I use the terms murder
and homicide interchangeably throughout this paper. Whenever I use either word, I am
referring to \the willful killing of one human being by another," which includes murder
and non-negligent manslaughter, but does not include justiable homicide.22 In order to
calculate annual crime rates by community area it is necessary estimate annual population
by community area. I use decennial census data to calculate community area populations
in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Between these years I use linear interpolation to estimate
annual community area populations. I estimate community area populations after 2000 by
extrapolating based on the linear trend between 1990 and 2000. Columns (1) through (3) of
Table 3 show population counts for the eight neighborhoods with high-rise public housing
for 1980, 1990, and 2000.
22More information regarding the FBI's denition of crimes under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program can be found here:
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/about/oense denitions.html.
93.2 Empirical Methodology
My goals are to estimate the local eect of public housing demolition on crime, and to
measure the city-wide eect of public housing demolition on crime. Correlation between
public housing demolition and crime reduction does not necessarily indicate that public
housing demolition is causing crime to fall. Levitt (2004) identies increases in the number
of police, the rising prison population, the receding crack epidemic, and the lagged eect
of the legalization of abortion in 1973 as factors contributing to the nationwide decline
in crime during the 1990's. All of these factors may contribute to the decrease in crime
in Chicago during the period in which public housing was being demolished, and could
potentially contribute to a spurious correlation between public housing demolition and crime.
In addition, it is likely that other, unobserved, factors also have an inuence on crime during
this period. For these reasons, identifying the correct counterfactual level of crime had public
housing not been demolished is dicult.
One solution could be to use a dierence-in-dierences estimator: essentially a compar-
ison between the change in crime in neighborhoods where public housing was demolished
and the change in crime in similar neighborhoods where public housing was not demolished.
However, historical factors indicate that neighborhoods where high-rise public housing was
built are not comparable to other neighborhoods. The problems are rooted in the original
sites selected for high-rise public housing in the 1950's and 1960's. The site selection process
was extremely contentious. In the end, high-rise public housing was built either as an ex-
tension to existing low-rise public housing developments or in low-income African-American
neighborhoods which had been designated as \blighted".23 This meant that almost all high-
rise public housing in Chicago was built in the neighborhoods closest to the downtown central
business district or along a contiguous stretch of land extending directly south of downtown
(see Figure 1).
Using neighborhoods where high-rise public housing sites were proposed but rejected as
controls is problematic as the sites that were rejected had quite dierent characteristics than
the sites that were eventually built upon. Site selection was a long and contentious process.
Initially the CHA investigated sites on the far north side, far south side, and center of the
city. It rejected the far north side sites based largely upon high land costs. The remaining
23Bowly, Jr. (1978), Meyerson and Baneld (1955), and Poliko (2006).
10sites were then presented to the Mayor and City Council, who eventually rejected the far
South Side sites at the behest of the aldermen who represented these neighborhoods and who
wanted to prevent African-Americans from moving in. As Table 4 shows, the sites rejected
by both the CHA and the City Council were located in neighborhoods that had relatively
fewer African-Americans, had higher income, had lower population density, and were further
from the central business district than the sites where high-rise public housing was eventually
built.24
From 1960 through 1990, the neighborhoods containing high-rise public housing remained
relatively low-income and predominantly African-American. Selecting suitable neighbor-
hoods for comparison based on 1990 characteristics is dicult, because all other neighbor-
hoods that are situated as close to downtown as the high-rise neighborhoods tend to be
predominantly White, Hispanic, or Asian and higher income. There are other low-income
African-American neighborhoods in Chicago, but they are much farther from downtown and
a number of them contain low-rise family public housing. It is important to exclude the
neighborhoods with low-rise public housing from any possible set of comparison neighbor-
hoods because they have been aected by the Plan for Transformation in an unsystematic
fashion. Some have been closed and demolished, while others have been lled with relo-
catees from the high-rises. Attempting to address the dierences between neighborhoods
where high-rise public housing was demolished and a set of comparison neighborhoods via
statistical methods of re-weighting or matching (such as by the propensity score) would
yield imprecise estimates due to the lack of common support. Table 5 displays the predicted
probability of a neighborhood containing high-rise public housing in 1990 based on a probit
using only the percentage of African-American households and the percentage of households
below the poverty line as explanatory variables. The estimate is from the sample of 68 neigh-
borhoods which did not contain low-rise public housing. Seven of the eight neighborhoods
with high-rise public housing have the highest propensity scores, illustrating the fact that
neighborhoods with high-rise public housing have quite dierent characteristics than those
without high-rise public housing.
24Meyerson and Baneld (1955) present a detailed case study of the site selection process and the political wrangling that
was associated with it.
113.2.1 Estimators That Exploit the Timing of Building Closures
Therefore, my proposed solution is to exploit variation in the timing and number of build-
ing closures prior to demolition among the eight neighborhoods which had high-rise public
housing. Instead of comparing neighborhoods with high-rise public housing to those with-
out high-rise public housing, I compare neighborhoods with high-rise public housing with
themselves before and after building closures.
In the next section, I present least squares estimates of  and j in the following regression
models:
Yi;t = i + t + Ci;t + i;t (1)
and
Yi;t = i + t +
b X
j=a
jFi;t j + i;t (2)
where Yi;t denotes an outcome in community area i in year t, for example, the number of
murders per capita in Grand Boulevard in 1999. Ci;t represents the cumulative number of
units closed. Fi;t j represent leads and lags of the ow variable: the number of units closed
in a particular year. This ow variable can be obtained by taking rst dierences of the
cumulative variable Fi;t = Ci;t   Ci;t 1. i and t are community area xed-eects and
year-eects, respectively. Finally, i;t represents unobservable determinants of outcome Yi;t.
The rst specication, Equation 1, provides a summary of the mean impact of unit
closure from the time of closure through the end of the sample period, while the second
specication, Equation 2, is useful for analyzing the dynamics of outcome Yi;t relative to
the year of a closure event. Specically, the rst specication assumes that the eect of
public housing demolition on crime at time t remains the same, irrespective of how many
years prior to t the closure occurred. The second specication allows for the eect of a
closure two years ago to dier from the eect of a closure three years ago. Equations 1 and
2 are estimated using a sample consisting only of the eight community areas where high-
rise public housing was demolished. It is important to note that inclusion of community
area xed-eects will absorb any unobservable characteristics of community areas which are
time-invariant. For example, xed-eects will control for persistent dierences in population
density between neighborhoods which may aect crime. Furthermore, the year-eects will
12absorb common transitory shocks to the eight high-rise public housing neighborhoods. For
example, aggregate changes and trends in crime will be controlled for (it is well known that
crime exhibits large trends over time). The  and j parameters are identied by variation
in the timing and number of unit closures across the eight aected community areas.
Any time-varying omitted variables which aect the outcome variable and are correlated
with the timing and number of closures but not absorbed by the year eects will cause OLS
estimates of the  parameter to be biased. One possible scenario in which OLS estimates may
be biased is if the order of building closures is determined by the crime level in prior years.
If this were the case, then a serially correlated shock to crime in a particular neighborhood
would cause crime to rise and might induce building closures. Building closures would occur
at the same time that crime is falling back to its mean level; hence, the eect of public housing
closures on lowering crime would be overstated. This problem is mitigated by the fact that
almost all of the high-rise buildings in the family public housing developments are slated
to be demolished eventually. There is anecdotal evidence that indicates that this type of
selection may be a problem in the earlier period of the sample.25 However, beginning in 2000,
the Plan for Transformation laid out the timetable for the remaining demolitions, so there
was less opportunity to selectively close buildings in response to crime shocks from 2000 on.
A check of whether buildings tend to be selected for closure in response to elevated crime
in prior years can be implemented by testing whether the j parameters are signicantly
greater than zero for j =  1; 2; 3;:::.
3.3 Results
In this section I present evidence about the impact of public housing demolition on crime in
Chicago neighborhoods where demolitions occur.
3.3.1 Local Eect of Demolitions on Murder
Figure 3 plots the murder rate from 1970 through 2008 for the 8 community areas that
had highrise public housing, the 13 community areas that received the most displace public
housing households per capita and the remaining 56 community areas in the City of Chicago.
The gure revels that murder rates were fairly constant and high in neighborhoods with
25Jacob (2004) and Poliko (2006) mention incidents such as the shooting of seven-year-old Dantrell Davis prior to demolitions
at Cabrini-Green and demolition of three Robert Taylor buildings known as \the hole" due to entrenched gang problems.
13highrise public housing until 1990, when the murder rate spiked from 60 to 80 murders per
100,00 people. The vertical line shows the year of the rst demolition, 1992. Following
1992, there was a rapid and dramatic decline in the murder rate in the neighborhoods where
demolitions were taking place. By 2008, the murder rate in these neighborhoods was below
20 per 100,000 people. The remainder of this section attempts to quantify the fraction of
the drop in the murder rate in the highrise neighborhoods that can be attributed to public
housing demolition. The next section addresses the question of what whether the high
relocation neighborhoods were adversely aected by the demolitions when compared to all
other neighborhoods.
Figure 4a plots estimates of the j coecients from Equation 2. The estimates are
obtained by regressing the murder rate (murders per 100,000 people) on the ow of closures
(the number of units closed in a particular year as opposed to the cumulative number of
closures), twenty leads of the ow of closures, and ten lags of the ow of closures. A large
number of leads is possible, as the murder series extends back to 1965. However, it is
important to note that with ten lags, the coecients at the far right of the plot are identied
only by the closures that occur toward the beginning of the program. Coecients can be
interpreted as the estimated eect of a the closure of 100 units in the years before and after
it occurs.26 On inspection, it appears that the eect prior to closure is about zero, while the
eect after closure is clearly negative. I take this as evidence in support of interpreting my
estimates of Equation 1 as causal estimates of the eect of closures on murder.
Table 6 presents OLS estimates of Equation 1 for neighborhood crime rates. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimates shown in the top row of Table 6 use
the cumulative number of high-rise units (divided by 100) closed prior to demolition as
the explanatory variable. The estimate in column (1) implies that each 100 units closed
is associated with about 0.5 fewer murders per 100,000 people per high-rise neighborhood.
The estimate is statistically dierent from zero at the 5% condence level. A mean of 2,118
high-rise units per aected community area were closed during the course of the sample;
thus, the estimate implies that building closures led to a decrease of about 11 murders per
100,000 people per year. This translates to approximately an 11% reduction in murders in the
neighborhoods where high-rises were demolished. Finally, the bottom row of the top panel
26100 units is near the mean number of units in a high rise building.
14shows that the reduction of 11 murders per 100,000 people corresponds to 14% of the total
drop in the murder rate from 99 to 22 murders per 100,000 people in these neighborhoods
between 1991 and 2008.
3.3.2 Local Eect of Demolitions on Other Crimes
The remaining columns and bottom panel of Table 6 present OLS estimates of the eect of
closures on the crime rate per 100,000 people for crimes other than murder. The estimate for
rape has a negative point estimate that would translate to similar percentage reduction from
the pre-demolition mean as murder, but the estimate is not statistically dierent from zero.
The decrease in the assault rate associated with closures is about 22 per 100,000 people per
year, a 14% decrease from the pre-demolition mean. The drop in the robbery rate is about
40 per 100,000 people per year (a 21% drop).
Figures 4b - 4g plots estimates of the j coecients from Equation 2 where the dependent
variable is crime rate per 100,000 people. These plots provide evidence about whether the
estimates in the previous paragraph are simply due to continuation of a pre-existing trend
or whether there is a clean break from before closure to after closure. In the latter case, a
causal interpretation of the estimates is more plausible. For rape, Figure 4b shows that the
estimates on leads of building closures tend to be around zero except eight and six years
before building closure, and are not signicantly dierent from zero after building closure.
Estimates on leads of closures for assault are close to zero. The lags show a clear drop,
with estimates for ve and six years after closure signicantly negative. The estimates on
the leads of closure for robbery appear to be zero prior to closure, and signicantly negative
ve years and more after closure. The estimates for burglary, theft, and auto-theft are not
signicantly dierent from zero in any period.
In summary, the estimates of Equation 1 and Equation 2 show reductions in crime rates
that are statistically dierent from zero for murder, assault, and robbery. However, there is
no discernable eect of closures on rape, burglary, theft, and auto-theft.
4 City-Wide Eect of Public Housing Demolition
In this section, I estimate the degree to which the direct reductions in neighborhood crime
associated with public housing demolition, shown in the previous section, are countered by
15increases in crime in other parts of the city due to displacement.
4.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
For this analysis, I use data on the relocation of public housing residents in Chicago who were
displaced by public housing demolitions. I also use city-level data on HOPE VI demolition
grants and city-level data on crime rates for a panel of cities in the United States.
4.1.1 Data Concerning Relocation of CHA Residents
From a policy evaluation standpoint, I am interested in measuring the eects of the CHA's
Plan for Transformation; however, the degree to which I am able to learn about the eects
of public housing de-concentration in general depends upon the specics of the relocation
process.
Several possible scenarios would allow the measurement of dierent eects. In the rst
scenario, residents who are induced to move by building closures evenly disperse throughout
the same neighborhood in which their public housing development was located. In this
scenario, neighborhood composition does not change; hence, the local eect measured in the
previous section would simply measure the eect of de-concentrating public housing residents
within a neighborhood and of demolishing poorly maintained high-rises. In this case, one
might not expect any crime displacement to other neighborhoods. A second possible scenario
would be that all former public housing residents left their old neighborhoods for other parts
of the city or moved out of the city entirely. Of course, the reality is some combination of
both scenarios.
The CHA's website describes the relocation process in the following way:
Every resident who occupied a CHA unit on October 1, 1999 and continues to
comply with the terms of their lease during the rebuilding process is entitled to
return to a redeveloped or rehabilitated unit. Many of these residents will need
to relocate from their existing apartments on at least a temporary basis to accom-
modate renewal. The CHA, in conjunction with other city departments and social
service organizations, manages this complex relocation process, helping residents
choose temporary and permanent replacement housing.27
27http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/plan_summary.html.
16I use data from two sources to learn about relocation of displaced CHA residents. The
rst, a study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), sheds some light
on where public housing residents moved when their buildings were closed. Eight hundred
residents whose buildings were closing in 2002 and 2003 were surveyed then and again in 2006.
The follow-up survey response rate was 83%. Of those who did respond, 37% were living
within one mile of their original building, 38% between one and ve miles of their original
building, 20% between ve and ten miles of their original building, and the remaining 8%
were living more than 10 miles from their original building. The residents' original buildings
were located in 11 dierent community areas. In 2006, 46% of those who responded were
living in the same 11 community areas (39% of the residents from the eight neighborhoods
with high-rise public housing were still living in those eight neighborhoods). Only 3% were
no longer living in the city. However, it is likely that the non-response rate was higher for
households that left Chicago. As of 2006, 19% of respondents had permanently relocated to
a CHA building, 37% had permanently relocated to voucher-based housing (Section 8), 35%
were temporarily relocated in a CHA building, 4% were temporarily relocated in voucher-
based housing, and the remaining 5% were still in their original unit. Adding the non-
respondents and those who reported moving out of Chicago results in an upper bound of
20% for the proportion of households that has left the city. The same assumption results
in 38% remaining in the 11 neighborhoods where buildings were closed, and 42% moving to
other neighborhoods within the city, primarily on the South Side and West Side.
The second source of information regarding displaced resident relocation is an August
2008 press release issued by the CHA. The press release reveals that 8,000 households who
held a lease with the CHA in October 1999 had moved as a result of building closures. Over
4,277 of those households have chosen to receive Housing Choice Vouchers HCV (also known
as Section 8 Vouchers), which can be used in the private rental market. The press release
shows that only 116 households (or 2.7%) who opted to receive HCV's have moved out of the
City of Chicago. The press release also provides a count of the number of these households
by the community area in which they currently live as of August 2008. Figure 5 shows
the geographic distribution of the households displaced by public housing demolitions as of
August 2008. In Figure 5 the high-rise neighborhoods are cross-hatched. The remaining
neighborhoods are divided into quintiles based upon the number of displaced public housing
17households per capita. Light to dark corresponds to least to most displaced public housing
households per capita.
4.1.2 HUD Demolition Grant and FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Data
I use data on HOPE VI demolition grants from HUD's website.28 The data cover the period
from 1996 through 2003, and provide the city, state, and name of the local housing authority
that is receiving the grant. The name of the development, number of units to be demolished,
dollar amount of the grant, and year are also specied.
Data on city-level crime rates come from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. I
use annual crime counts and population data reported by municipal police departments from
1960 through 2004 from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. For the years 2005
through 2008, I obtain annual crime counts and population for municipal police departments
from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting website.29
4.2 Empirical Methodology
A critical question is whether public housing demolition leads to a net reduction in crime or
simply causes it to move from one area to another. I attempt to determine whether public
housing demolitions lead to a net reduction in crime in two ways. First, I attempt to estimate
the impact of households that were displaced by public housing demolition in Chicago on
the neighborhoods to which they moved. For this analysis, I split the 69 community areas
that did not contain high-rise public housing into quintiles based on the number of relocated
households that had moved to the community area by 2008 divided by the population of the
community area. Next, I calculate the mean change in each crime rate for each quintile.30
While these estimates reveal what happened to crime rates in community areas that received
28http://www.hud.gov/oces/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/demolition/
29http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm
30Another possible way to do this analysis is to construct a proxy for the cumulative number of households that have relocated
to a particular community area after having been displaced by CHA building closures. Given the data, the only feasible way
to do this is to calculate the number of relocatees by assuming that the fraction of households moving from one of the eight
community areas where high-rise demolitions occur is always equal to the fraction in the NORC survey. For example, in the
NORC survey, 14% of households who relocated from the Near West Side moved to Austin. Thus, for every building closure
that occurs in the Near West Side, there is an increase in the Relocatees observation for Austin in the same year by 14% of the
number of households aected by the building closure. With this assumption, it is possible to use the specication presented
in Equation 1. In this case, Ci;t is a measure of the number of public housing residents that were displaced by demolitions and
have relocated to community area i in year t. However, the assumption that ows between demolition neighborhoods were also
the same as they were between 2003 and 2006 does not seem realistic. Furthermore, I would be wary about assigning a causal
interpretation to this type of estimate as it may be biased due to endogeneity of the explanatory variable. If households chose
to move to neighborhoods that had experienced a serially correlated downward shock to crime in the previous period, then OLS
estimates of the eect of relocatee households on crime will be negatively biased.
18a high number of relocatees, it is impossible to know how crime rates in these neighborhoods
would have changed had the neighborhoods received no relocatees. For this reason, I consider
a second strategy. I estimate the net eect of public housing demolition on the crime rate of
a panel of roughly 120 cities which received HOPE VI demolition grants. For this analysis,
I use specications similar to Equations (1) and (2). However, in this case the outcome, Yi;t,
is the crime rate in city i in year t, i are city xed-eects, t are still year-eects, and Ci;t
is a variable that is equal to zero in every year before a city receives a HOPE VI demolition
grant. In the year that a grant is received and all subsequent years, Ci;t is equal to the
number of units listed in the demolition grant divided by the mean population of the city
during the sample period. This city-level analysis identies only the net eect on crime. If
crime is simply displaced from one neighborhood to another, and there is no net change in
crime for the city as a whole, then receiving a HOPE VI demolition grant should have no
eect on a city's crime rate.
4.3 Results
In this section, I present evidence concerning the net eect of public housing demolition
on crime. First, I consider measures of the amount of crime that follows displaced public
housing residents to their new neighborhoods in Chicago. Subsequently, I turn to a panel of
the roughly 120 cities which received HOPE VI demolition grants to learn about the eect
of receiving a demolition grant on the city's crime rates.
4.3.1 Displacement of Crime in Chicago
Table 7 presents OLS estimates of crime rate growth rate regressed on dummy variables
indicating whether the community area is in one of the top four quintiles of how many
displaced public housing households they received per capita. The growth rates are computed
from 1991 to 2008. The 69 community areas in Chicago that did not have high rise public
housing developments are included in the sample. The rst row in column (1) shows that
in the 14 neighborhoods that received the most displaced public housing tenants per capita
murder rates fell on average by about 31% relative to the set of neighborhoods that received
the fewest displaced public housing households per capita. The second row in column (2)
reveals a similar size drop in the murder rate for the 14 community areas that received the
next highest number of displaced public housing tenants per capita. Finally, the murder
19rate for quintiles 3 and 4 (shown in rows 3 and 4) did not fall by as much, on average,
as the it did for quintile 5, which received the fewest displaced public housing tenants per
capita. None of these coecients are statistically dierent from zero, but it appears that
murder rates shrank by at least as much in the neighborhoods that received a lot of displaced
public housing residents as they did in the neighborhoods that received very few displaced
public housing residents. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to the growth rates
in the number of rapes per capita when comparing neighborhoods that received the most
and the least displaced public housing residents by examining column (2). Columns (3) and
(4) reveal that the growth rates of assault and robbery are slightly higher, on average, in
the neighborhoods that received the most displaced public housing households compared to
the neighborhoods that received the fewest displaced public housing households, but not
signicantly so.
Columns (5), (6), and (7) in the bottom panel of Table 7 show a dierent pattern for the
growth rates of property crime. For example, while the constant term indicates burglary rates
dropped by about 50% in the neighborhoods that received the fewest displaced public housing
residents, the coecient in the rst row shows that the average growth rate of burglaries
in the neighborhoods that received the most displaced public housing residents was about
33 percentage point higher, meaning that burglary rates fell in those neighborhoods by only
20%, on average. Columns (6) and (7) reveal similar patterns for theft and auto theft.
In summary, while it is impossible to know what would have happened to crime rates in
neighborhoods that received displaced public housing households had they not come, Table
7 shows that violent crime rates did not fall by less in the neighborhoods that received
a large number of displaced public housing households per capita, than they did in other
neighborhoods. However, the story is dierent for property crimes. Burglary, theft, and auto-
theft rates fell by only about half as much in the 13 neighborhoods that received the most
displaced public housing residents per capita as they did in other neighborhoods. Putting
these estimates together with the direct eects measured in the previous section it is possible
to come up with a rough idea of the net eect of the demolitions on crime rates for the whole
city of Chicago. Assuming the demolitions were responsible for no change in the murder rate
in non-highrise neighborhoods and that the demolitions were responsible for a drop from
99 to 88 murders per 100,000 people per year in the highrise neighborhoods, then the fact
20that the non-highrise neighborhoods had a murder rate of about 27 per 100,000 people and
comprised about 92% of the cities population implies that the net reduction in the city's
murder rate due to demolitions is about 2.7%. Similar calculations for the net reduction in
the city's assault and robbery rates due to public housing demolition yield 3.0% and 4.4%,
respectively.
While these results oer some clues about the degree to which public housing demolition
displaced crime from neighborhoods where it occurred to other neighborhoods, they are
not entirely convincing. In the next sub-section I pursue a more direct approach toward
estimating the net eect of public housing demolition on city-wide crime rates.
4.3.2 City-Wide Eect of Demolitions on the Murder Rate
Next, I turn to estimates of the eect of receiving a HOPE VI demolition grant on a city-wide
crime rates. Table 8 presents estimates of Equation 1. Estimates in the upper panel are
from a sample of all cities which received HOPE VI demolition grants from 1996 through
2003. The explanatory variable labeled \Grant Units / 100K Pop." is a variable which is
equal to zero until the year in which a particular city received its rst demolition grant and
then is equal to the number of units specied in the grant divided by the mean population of
the city during the sample period. The coecient can be interpreted as the change in crime
per capita that would result from receiving a HOPE VI grant to demolish a unit of public
housing per capita. The mean grant is for about 240 units per 100,000 of city population,
so the mean eect of HOPE VI can be found by multiplying the coecient by 240.
The specication in column (1) shows a reduction of about 0.60 murders per year per
100,000 residents, which translates to a reduction of about 3% from a pre-demolition mean
murder rate of 20 murders per year per 100,000 residents for the sample of 121 cities that
received demolition grants. The point estimate for this specication is signicantly dierent
from zero at the 1% level. It is interesting to note that the 3% reduction in the murder rate is
similar to the the net eect of demolitions in Chicago calculated in the previous sub-section.
Figure 6a plots the j coecients from Equation 2. The left plot is for the full sample
of 121 cities which received demolition grants. The coecients can be interpreted as being
relative to the year before receiving a demolition grant (for which the coecient is normalized
to zero). The coecients appear to be close to zero prior to receiving a demolition grant,
21signicantly less than zero in the three years after the demolition grant is awarded, but then
return to zero four years after the grant is received.
The results suggest that HOPE VI public housing demolition grants are associated with
reductions in the murder rate of the city that receives the grant of about 3%. This number
is in line with the approximate net reduction in the murder rate due to public housing
demolitions calculated in the previous sub-section using more geographically detailed data
for Chicago. However, the year-by-year estimates shown in Figure 6a suggests that this
reduction may only last for several years.
4.3.3 City-Wide Eect of Demolitions on other Crime Rates
Column (3) reveals that demolition grants are associated with a statistically signicant drop
in a city's assault rate of about half an assault per capita for each grant unit per capita. For
the mean grant size per capita, this translates to a 1.7% drop in the city-wide assault rate
from the mean 1991 assault rate. The persistence of the drop in the assault rate is shown in
Figure 6c. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 8 show no discernable eect of HOPE VI demolition
grants on rape or robbery rates. Figure 6b does not show signs of a clear pattern either.
Figure 6d shows signs of a reduction in robbery rates following a demolition grant. Columns
(5) and (6) reveal that HOPE VI grants are not associated with a statistically signicant
change in burglary or theft rates. Figures 6e and 6f show signs of a drop in burglary and
theft rates beginning around the year after receiving the demolition grant, but the drops
are not particularly clear. Column (7) of Table 8 shows a statistically signicant drop in
auto-theft associated with demolition grants. For the mean grant this translates to about a
1% drop in auto-theft from the 1991 mean. The drop is not reected particularly clearly in
Figure 6g.
To some extent, the decrease in auto-theft associated with receiving a HOPE VI demoli-
tion grant is not consistent with the results in the previous sub-section and previous section
for Chicago. In Chicago, public housing demolition did not appear to be related to changes
in auto-theft rates. At the same time, neighborhoods that received a lot of displaced pub-
lic housing residents saw signicantly smaller reductions in auto-theft rates between 1991
and 2008 than other neighborhoods did. However, since Chicago is just one of 121 cities in
the current analysis, it may be that Chicago looks like an average city in terms of how its
22murder rate responds to demolitions but not in terms of how its auto-theft rate responds to
demolitions.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence regarding the neighborhood-level and city-wide im-
pact of the HOPE VI public housing demolition program on crime. It is the rst to show that
Chicago's large-scale public housing demolition program is associated with large drops in vi-
olent crime where public housing is demolished. Furthermore, estimates from 121 cities that
received HOPE VI demolition grants indicate that public housing demolition is associated
with a net reduction in city-wide murder and assault rates.
These results provide support for theories which predict that high concentrations of
low-income households will lead to a greater amount of crime than would occur if low-
income households were more evenly spatially distributed. The evidence is consistent with
economic theories that emphasize the importance of social interaction or peer eects for
crime, sociological theories that emphasize disorder and the breakdown of collective ecacy
that can occur when poverty is spatially concentrated, and urban design theories that focus
on the degree to which certain building designs enable criminals to avoid capture.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that, in Chicago, public housing demolitions are
associated with an 11% decrease in murder in neighborhoods where high-rise public housing
is demolished. Furthermore, besides rape, the drop in other violent crimes attributed to
demolitions ranges from 14% to 21% in neighborhoods where high-rise public housing is
demolished. Evidence on crime displacement stemming from public housing demolitions in
Chicago is mixed. Rates of decline in violent crime in neighborhoods that received many
displaced public housing residents appear to about the same as those in other neighborhoods.
However, in neighborhoods that received the most displaced public housing households,
property crime rates had rates of decline that were about half the size of those in other
neighborhoods. Finally, examining the set of 121 cities that received HOPE VI demolition
grants reveals that declines in murder, assault, and auto-theft rates ranging from 1% to 3%
are associated with receiving a demolition grant. The net reduction for city-wide murder
rates (3%) is very similar to that implied by the analysis of Chicago (2.7%). This implies
that the reduction in murders in neighborhoods where high-rise public housing is demolished
23is not being oset by an increase in murder elsewhere in the city. For murder and assault,
displacement due to public housing demolition is likely to be small.
While I am unable to say whether de-concentration of public housing increases welfare,
it is clear that policy makers with an objective of minimizing city-wide homicide and assault
rates should avoid promoting the spatial concentration of low-income households by building
large high-rise public housing developments as they did in Chicago in the 1950's and early
1960's. The results point to possible benets of the current move toward a more even
spatial distribution of public housing which emphasizes scattered-site low-rise construction
and mixed-income developments.
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Figure 3: Murder Rate in High-Rise Public Housing Neighborhoods, High Relocation Rate Neighborhoods,
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Figure 6: Eect of HOPE VI demolition grants.
33Table 1: CHA Family Housing Developments
Development Name High-Rise Year Completed Community Area (Number) Units
ABLA Homes Yes 1961 Near West Side (28) 3,699
Altgeld-Murray Homes No 1945/1954 Riverdale (54) 1,996
Bridgeport Homes No 1943 Bridgeport (60) 141
Cabrini-Green Homes Yes 1942/1962 Near North Side (8) 3,211
Dearborn Homes Yes 1950 Armour Square (34) 48
Douglas (35) 752
Henry Horner Homes Yes 1957/1961 Near West Side (28) 1,933
Hilliard Homes Yes 1966 Near South Side (33) 345
Ickes Homes Yes 1955 Near South Side (33) 803
Douglas (35) 203
Lakefront Homes Yes 1963 Oakland (36) 923
Lathrop Homes No 1937 North Center (5) 408
Lincoln Park (7) 468
Lawndale Gardens No 1942 North Lawndale (29) 187
South Lawndale (30) 128
LeClaire Courts No 1954 Gareld Ridge (56) 612
Lowden Homes No 1953 Roseland (49) 127
Robert Taylor Homes Yes 1962 Grand Boulevard (38) 3,312
Washington Park (40) 1,103
Rockwell Gardens Yes 1961 Near West Side (28) 1,136
Stateway Gardens Yes 1958 Armour Square (34) 920
Douglas (35) 724
Trumball Park Homes No 1938 South Deering (51) 486
Washington Park Homes Yes 1962 Grand Boulevard (38) 911
Washington Park (40) 546
Wells-Darrow-Madden Homes Yes 1941/1961/1970 Douglas (35) 1,520
Oakland (36) 1,268
Grand Boulevard (38) 289
Wentworth Gardens No 1945 Armour Square (34) 422
Note: Total number of units as of 1990 for each non scattered-site, non city-state family development broken down by com-
munity area. High-rise indicates whether the development contained any high-rise buildings.
34Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highrise 1990 Highrise 2000 Whole City 1990 Whole City 2000
Median Income 36.2K 37.3K 47.0K 41.1K
Median Home Value - 212K 155K 174K
Median Rent 572 627 613 642
Population 27.6K 26.9K 36.8K 38.3K
Households 12.0K 12.6K 13.6K 14.1K
Housing Units 14.9K 15.0K 15.0K 15.2K
HH Size 2.53 2.54 3.04 2.96
% Owner Occupied 17.6 29.1 41.0 43.7
% Units Vacant 19.9 15.8 9.4 7.8
% African-American 65.9 54.8 38.4 36.2
% Under 18 40.0 22.6 37.4 26.2
% Over 65 12.2 11.2 11.9 10.4
% Female Head 43.0 28.4 29.4 18.5
% Employed 41.2 51.1 55.7 54.3
% Public Asst. 26.4 9.5 14.2 6.8
% Under Poverty Line 41.9 29.2 20.4 18.6
% HS Grad. 60.9 74.0 64.1 70.0
% College Grad. 23.6 36.1 17.5 22.9
Murder 23.5 9.9 11.9 7.7
Rape 72.3 30.5 43.2 25.5
Assault 790 472 457 344
Robbery 1,018 306 561 250
Burglary 646 286 669 367
Theft 3,113 2,233 1,672 1,355
Auto Theft 660 364 605 383
Note: Population/Housing Unit weighted mean community area demographic data from 1990 and 2000 Census. All
dollar amounts are in terms of year 2000 dollars. Highrise denotes 8 community areas with public housing develop-
ments that include high-rises. Income, rent, and home values are measured in year 2000 dollars. Median home values
are not reported for 47 of the 121 census tracts in high-rise neighborhoods in 1990. In 2000, median home value data
are missing for 13 high-rise census tracts. Similarly, there are too few home transactions in my data set to report
median home prices for 1990. Crime means listed in columns (1) and (3) are for 1991.
35Table 3: Decennial Population and the Number of Households Displaced by Closures in Neighborhoods
where High-Rises were Demolished
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Community Area Pop. 1980 Pop. 1990 Pop. 2000 HH Disp. in 1990's HH Disp. in 2000's
Near North Side 67,158 62,842 72,811 367 644
Near West Side 57,296 46,197 46,419 708 612
Near South Side 7,243 6,828 9,509 322 418
Armour Square 12,475 10,801 12,032 68 418
Douglas 35,700 30,652 26,470 311 136
Oakland 16,748 8,197 6,100 184 513
Grand Boulevard 53,741 35,897 28,006 542 495
Washington Park 31,935 19,425 14,146 279 260
Total 282,296 220,839 215,503 2,781 3,168
Note: Population numbers from the Decennial Census are presented in columns (1) through (3). Columns (4) and (5) show an
estimate of the number of households that were displaced by building closures in the 1990's and from 2000 through 2007, re-
spectively. NORC survey data show that 39% of households that were displaced by building closures in 2002 and 2003 were still
living in the 8 neigborhoods listed above in 2006.
Table 4: 1950 Characteristics of Neighborhoods where High-Rise Public Housing was Proposed
(1) (2) (3)
Accepted Sites Rejected by CHA Rejected by City Council
% African-American 65.6 0.4 4.7
Median Income 14.5k 28.7k 24.5k
Population per Square Mile 3.03k 2.80k 1.47k
Distance to CBD (miles) 2.82 7.74 8.29
Note: Population weighted community area means calculated from 1950 census data. All dollar amounts are in terms
of year 2000 dollars. Column (1) includes 8 community areas where high-rise public housing was built: Near North
Side, Near West Side, Near South Side, Armour Square, Douglas, Oakland, Grand Boulevard, Washington Park.
Column (2) includes 5 North Side community areas containing sites considered for high-rise public housing but ulti-
mately rejected by the CHA due to high cost of obtaining land: Rogers Park, West Ridge, Uptown, Lincoln Square,
and North Park. Column (3) includes 9 South Side community areas containing sites considered for high-rise public
housing but ultimately rejected due to objections from the City Council: South Chicago, South Deering, East Side,
West Pullman, Riverdale, Hegewisch, Gareld Ridge, McKinley Park, New City, Clearing. (Source: Bowly, Jr. (1978)
and Brad Hunt's notes from CHA historical archives.)
36Table 5: 20 Neighborhoods with the Highest Predicted Probability of Containing High-Rise Public Housing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighborhood High-Rise Public Housing P-Score % Under Poverty Line % African-American
Rogers Park No 0.015 27.5 19.5
Near North Side Yes 0.023 23.3 20.0
Albany Park No 0.036 3.4 17.5
Woodlawn No 0.038 96.0 37.0
Hermosa No 0.038 2.0 17.4
Avondale No 0.039 1.3 17.4
Uptown No 0.074 22.3 24.2
Austin No 0.085 99.2 40.8
Englewood No 0.145 99.2 43.2
Humboldt Park No 0.166 50.5 33.8
Logan Square No 0.224 6.8 26.4
New City No 0.245 41.3 34.1
East Gareld Park No 0.333 98.9 48.1
Lower West Side No 0.333 1.1 27.8
Fuller Park No 0.387 98.6 49.2
West Town No 0.439 10.6 31.9
Douglas Yes 0.469 91.6 49.4
Armour Square Yes 0.523 22.2 36.0
Washington Park Yes 0.805 99.4 58.4
Near West Side Yes 0.889 67.0 54.5
Near South Side Yes 0.938 93.5 62.5
Grand Boulevard Yes 0.952 99.4 64.7
Oakland Yes 0.996 99.4 72.3
Note: 20 neighborhoods with the highest predicted probability of containing high-rise public housing estimated by probit using the
percentage of households below the poverty line in 1990 and the percentage of African-American households in 1990 as explanatory
variables on a sample of the 68 community areas that do not contain low-rise public housing. Marginal eects (condence levels) are
0.321 (0.002) for percent under the poverty line and -0.067 (0.080) for percent African-American.
37Table 6: OLS Estimates of the Eect of Closures on Crime Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Murder Rape Assault Robbery
100 Units Closed -0.50** -1.1 -22** -39***
(0.21) (0.74) (9.0) (8.6)
Observations 352 144 144 144
R-squared 0.66 0.86 0.90 0.87
1991 Mean 99 295 3,301 3,990
2008 Mean 22 68 830 813
Change Attributed to Demo -11 -470 -829
Growth Attributed to Demo -11% -14% -21%
Fraction of Drop Explained 14% 19% 26%
(5) (6) (7)
Burglary Theft Auto Theft
100 Units Closed -13** 57 7.9
(5.2) (32) (13)
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.89 0.87 0.70
1991 Mean 2,465 11,000 2,597
2008 Mean 966 4,910 897
Change Attributed to Demo -281
Growth Attributed to Demo -11%
Fraction of Drop Explained 19%
Note: Crime rates are expressed as number of crimes per 100,000 people. Unit of observation is
community area - year. All specications include community area eects and year eects. Eicker-
White standard errors are shown in parentheses. A mean of 2118 units per high-rise community
area had been closed for demolition as of 2008.
38Table 7: OLS Estimates of Growth in Crime Rates from 1991 to 2008 on Number of
Relocatees per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Murder Rape Assault Robbery
Q1: Most Relocatees per Capita -0.31 -0.16 0.03 0.08
(0.48) (0.13) (0.18) (0.09)
Q2 -0.35 -0.19 0.06 0.08
(0.49) (0.14) (0.18) (0.10)
Q3 0.07 -0.19 -0.04 0.18
(0.54) (0.15) (0.20) (0.21)
Q4 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06
(0.68) (0.18) (0.18) (0.09)
Constant -0.07 -0.32** -0.37** -0.52***
(0.47) (0.12) (0.17) (0.07)
(5) (6) (7)
Burglary Theft Auto Theft
Q1: Most Relocatees per Capita 0.33** 0.17** 0.28***
(0.14) (0.08) (0.05)
Q2 0.11 0.07 0.20***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.04)
Q3 -0.03 -0.06 0.02
(0.10) (0.08) (0.03)
Q4 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03)
Constant -0.53*** -0.33*** -0.72***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
Note: Dependent variable is the growth in the crime rate from 1991 to 2008. Unit of observation is non-
highrise community area. 69 observations for all columns except 57 for column (1) due to 12 community
areas which have zero murders in 1991. Eicker-White standard errors are shown in parentheses.
39Table 8: OLS Estimates of the Eect of HOPE VI Demolition Grants on Crime Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Murder Rape Assault Robbery Burglary Theft Auto Theft
Demolition City
Grant Units / 100K Pop. -0.0025*** 0.0030 -0.062*** 0.003 0.055 0.010 -0.058***
(0.0009) (0.0020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.041) (0.085) (0.018)
Observations 4,929 4,899 4,937 4,936 4,940 4,940 4,937
R-squared 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.76 0.70 0.73 0.73
1991 Mean 20.06 64.28 862.1 597.2 2,190 5,212 1,196
2008 Mean 14.29 46.68 554.6 360.8 1,323 3,436 543.8
Change Attributed to Demo -0.60 -14.9 -13.8
Growth Attributed to Demo -3.0% -1.7% -1.2%
Note: Crime rates are expressed as number of crimes per 100,000 people. Unit of observation is city - year. Main explanatory variable is
constructed as the ratio of the number of units that the HOPE VI demolition grant is for to the mean population of the city. All specica-
tions include city xed eects and year eects. Eicker-White standard errors are shown in parentheses. The mean ratio of the number of
units that the HOPE VI demolition grant is for to population across the cities in the panel is 241 HOPE VI units per 100,000 people. In
Chicago the ratio is 169 HOPE VI units per 100,000 people.
40